A Regulation Enforcement Solution for Multi-agent Reinforcement Learning by Sun, Fan-Yun et al.
A Regulation Enforcement Solution for Multi-agent Reinforcement Learning
Fan-Yun Sun1 , Yen-Yu Chang1 , Yueh-Hua Wu1,2 and Shou-De Lin1
1National Taiwan University
2Riken-AIP
{b04902045,b03901138}@ntu.edu.tw, {d06922005, sdlin}@csie.ntu.edu.tw
Abstract
Human behaviors are regularized by a variety of
norms or regulations, either to maintain orders or
to enhance social welfare. If artificially intelligent
(AI) agents make decisions on behalf of human be-
ings, we would hope they can also follow estab-
lished regulations while interacting with humans or
other AI agents. However, it is possible that an AI
agent can opt to disobey the regulations (being de-
fective) for self-interests. In this paper, we aim to
answer the following question: Consider a multi-
agent decentralized environment. Agents make
decisions in complete isolation of other agents.
Each agent knows the state of its own MDP and
its own actions but it does not know the states
and the actions taken by other players. There
are a set of regulations for all agents to follow.
Although most agents are benign and will com-
ply to regulations but not all agents are compli-
ant at first, can we develop a framework such
that it is in the self-interest of non-compliant
agents to comply after all? We formulate the
problem using reinforcement learning and game
theory and then propose a solution based on the
key idea that although we could not alter how de-
fective agents choose to behave, we can, however,
leverage the aggregated power of compliant agents
to boycott the defective ones. We conducted sim-
ulated experiments on two scenarios: Replenishing
Resource Management Dilemma and Diminishing
Reward Shaping Enforcement, using deep multi-
agent reinforcement learning algorithms. We fur-
ther use empirical game-theoretic analysis to show
that the method alters the resulting empirical payoff
matrices in a way that promotes compliance (mak-
ing mutual compliant a Nash Equilibrium).
1 Introduction
Consider the driving matrix game shown below.
Two autonomous cars driving on a road against each other,
they have to choose either to swerve on the left (L) or to
swerve on the right (R) of the road. Introducing regulations
(e.g. the right car should yield) here can mitigate ambiguities
Driving Matrix Game L R
L 1, 1 0, 0
R 0, 0 1, 1
and avoid lose-lose situations. Furthermore, some regulations
are not there to prevent agents from making malevolent deci-
sions or to enhance agents’ self-interest, they are there for eth-
ical reasons or to enhance welfare of the society as a whole.
Human beings opt to follow such regulations even if it un-
dermines their self-interests because either they are afraid of
being punished by authorities (i.e. government), or they are
well-educated with civic consciousness. Unfortunately, such
awareness may not exist for some AI agents that are trained
to maximize individual rewards. In other words, without cer-
tain special design (e.g hard-coding ethical rules for agents to
follow or specifically trained toward altruism), we shall not
expect a normal AI agent to obey regulations that lead to sac-
rifice of its rewards. Similar to human society, even a small
amount of AI agents not compliant to existing regulations can
lead to catastrophe.
Consider a real-world dilemma - Replenishing Resource
Management Dilemma. It describes a situation in which
group members share a replenishing resource (e.g. lumber-
ing or fishing) that will continue to produce benefits unless
being over-harvested [Wikipedia, 2019]. Regulations such as
International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling are
signed by many countries to constrain the harvesting behav-
ior. In the future, it is likely that robots become the main force
to harvest such resources, and thus it is crucial to design a
framework to prevent agents from violating the regulation to
maximize self-interests.
There have been some works aiming at designing ethical
AI agent instead of one that only optimizes its own rewards.
For example, assuming in a multi-agent environment, [Sun
et al., 2018] proposes a design for benevolent (non-greedy)
agents through shaping the reward function. They propose
the idea of diminished rewards that leads to less satisfac-
tion for consecutive rewards, and consequently achieves non-
greediness of agents as they are not motivated to obtain re-
sources rapidly and repeatedly. In the experiment consisting
of both stronger and weaker agents, it is shown that imple-
menting such reward function can lead to more balanced dis-
tribution of resources. Although the diminishing reward func-
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tion seems to be a favorable solution from the social-welfare
point of view, there is no incentive for the stronger agents to
implement such feature since it hurts their overall rewards.
Enforcing every single agent to comply can be difficult.
In this paper, we aim to address the following problem,
named Regulation Enforcement: There are regulations that
the society expect all agents to comply, but certain individuals
can gain advantage by not complying. Our goal is to design
a solution such that it is in the self-interest of non-compliant
agents to comply. There are many literature that discuss how
to regulate agents behaviour with many mental constructs
such as BDI agent research [Meneguzzi and Luck, 2009;
Alechina et al., 2012; Lee et al., 2014].However, it is not
applicable in our scenario as we consider the scenario where
no centralized authority can control agents’ internal design.
Penalizing Defective 1 agents is only possible when there
are special purpose agents deployed (i.e. “police” as in real
world) but this is not our case.
We make the assumption that at least a certain percent-
age of agents are Compliant, which is reasonable in most
real-world scenarios. Our solution leverages the power of
the crowd, eliminating the need of deploying special pur-
pose agents. There are two major components: a detector
and a boycotting strategy. The boycotting strategy states that
agents shall shape their policy in a way that boycotts the non-
complying agents, which is identified by the detector. By
implementing this framework, we expect Defective agents to
lose incentives to disobey regulations since being Defective
can increase the chance of being detected and then boycotted,
which results in lower return.
We summarize our contributions as below:
• To our knowledge, this is the first work to introduce the
task of Regulation Enforcement. We believe it could
become a crucial problem with the pervasiveness of AI
agents. We further provide a formal definition from as-
pects of reinforcement learning and game theory. Note
that we consider different settings when compared with
not literature of normative agent-based systems.
• We propose a simple yet effective solution to solve this
problem in a decentralized environment. Our solution
contains a detector and a general boycotting policy. Al-
though we could not directly alter the policy of Defective
agents in a decentralized environment, the Compliant
agents are highly motivated to comply since then they
can contribute to the prevention of Defective agents by
lessening their rewards.
• We evaluate the effectiveness of our model on simu-
lated scenarios of Replenishing Resource Management
Dilemma and Diminishing Reward Shaping Enforce-
ment. We also use empirical game-theoretic analysis to
further show how empirical payoff matrices evolve after
applying our method. Results shown are promising.
1We name agents that comply to all regulations as Compliant and
agents that disobey one or more regulations as Defective.
2 Preliminaries
2.1 Normative Agent-Based Systems
In normative systems, regulations are enforced in regimenta-
tions or sanctions. Regimentation explicitly prevents agents
from reaching certain states of affairs (i.e. close a road to pre-
vent cars from entering the road) while sanctions impose pun-
ishments on agents that violate the norms (i.e.fines for traffic
violation). However, neither of this will work under our sce-
nario because there are no authorities that have the power to
change the environment, constrain agents’ behavior, or im-
pose punishments on individuals. In our paper, we are lever-
aging the collective power of compliant agents to sanction
those defective ones. This is a major difference when com-
paring our work with related works on normative multi-agent
systems.
2.2 Reinforcement Learning
RL defines a class of algorithms solving problems modeled as
a Markov Decision Process (MDP). A n-player partially ob-
servable Markov gameM is defined by a set of states S and
an observation function O : S × {1, 2, ..., n} → Rd specify-
ing each player’s d-dimensional view, along with n sets of ac-
tions allowable from any state {A1,A2, ...,An}, one for each
player, a transition function T : S ×A1 ×A2 × ...×An →
∆(S), where ∆(S) denotes the set of discrete probability dis-
tributions over S, and a reward function for each player i:
ri : S×A1×A2× ...×An → R. LetOi = {oi | s ∈ S, oi =
O(s, i)} be the observation space of player i, to choose ac-
tions, each player uses policy pii : Oi → ∆(Ai).
For temporal discount factor γ ∈ [0, 1] we can define the
long-term payoff as V ~pii (s0) for player i when the joint policy
~pi = (pi1, pi2, ..., pin) is followed starting from state s0 ∈ S.
V ~pii (s0) = E~at∼~pi(O(st)),st+1∼T (st,~at)
[ ∞∑
t=0
γtri(st,~at)
]
.
(1)
2.3 Game Theory
A normal-form game is a tuple (S, f, n) where n is the
number of players, Si is the strategy set for player i, S =
S1 × S2 × · · · × Sn is the set of strategy profiles and f(x) =
(f1(x), . . . , fn(x)) is its payoff function evaluated at x ∈ S.
Let xi be a strategy of player i and x−i be a strategy pro-
file of all players excluding player i. When each player
i ∈ {1, . . . , n} chooses strategy xi resulting in strategy pro-
file x = (x1, . . . , xn) then player i obtains payoff fi(x). Note
that the payoff depends on the strategy profile chosen, i.e., on
the strategy chosen by player i as well as the strategies chosen
by all the other players. Extensive-form games extend these
formalisms to the multistep sequential case (e.g. poker).
Matrix Games are two-player games where each player
has two strategies to choose from. It is the special case of
two-player perfectly observable (Oi(s) = s) Markov games
obtained when |S| = 1 and A1 = A2 = {C,D}, where C
and D are called (atomic) cooperate and defect respectively.
Matrix Games serve as mathematical model of many of the
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simplest conflict situation in the areas of economics, mathe-
matical statistics, war science, and biology.
A Nash Equilibrium is a strategy profile x∗ ∈ S such
that no unilateral deviation in strategy by any single player is
profitable for that player, that is,
∀i, xi ∈ Si : fi(x∗i , x∗−i) ≥ fi(xi, x∗−i). (2)
When the inequality above holds strictly (with > instead of
≥) for all players and all feasible alternative strategies, the
equilibrium is classified as a Strict Nash Equilibrium. If in-
stead, for some player, there is exact equality between x∗i and
some other strategy in the set S, then the equilibrium is clas-
sified as a Weak Nash Equilibrium.
Empirical game-theoretic analysis (EGTA) is the study
of meta-strategies (or styles of play) obtained through simu-
lation in complex games [Walsh et al., 2002].
3 Problem Formulation
Our goal is to design a strategy to discourage the violation
of regulations to gain more rewards in multi-agent scenarios
where agents make their own decisions. Note that we use the
term regulation instead of constraint because agents can pos-
sibly violate regulation but not constraint. Our targeted prob-
lem is different from constrained MDPs [Altman, 1999]. The
proposed problem, namely the Regulation Enforcement, is
formulated as below:
LetM be a n-player Markov game and there are N regu-
lations that regularize the agents’ behavior. Regulations can
be defined in two ways:
• Defined in the reward function space such as requiring
agents to shape their reward function in a certain way,
i.e. implement diminishing reward shaping [Sun et al.,
2018] so that resource is distributed more equally among
agents.
• Defined in the policy space like requiring agents to
behave in a certain way in specific situations, i.e.
stopping the car at a red light can be formulated as
pi(state = observe red light) = stop.
ΠC denotes the set of policies that follow all regulations, and
ΠD denotes the set of policies that violate one or more reg-
ulations. In this paper, agent i with the policy pii is labelled
as Compliant(C) if pii ∈ ΠC and Defective(D) if pii ∈ ΠD.
Under this setting, ΠC
⋂
ΠD = ∅ and ΠC ⋃ΠD = Π (the
set of all legal policies).
We denote the set (pi1, pi2, ..., pin) as the resulting joint pol-
icy under the assumption that at least M% (M=80 in our ex-
periments) of agents are Compliant (pij ∈ ΠC). Let piCj , piDj
denote the resulting policy of agent j being Compliant and
Defective respectively. The demand of Regulation Enforce-
ment comes from the following assumption:
∃j s.t. V (pi1,pi2,...,pi
C
j ,...pin)
j (s0) < V
(pi1,pi2,...,pi
D
j ,...pin)
j (s0)
(3)
where s0 is the starting state. That means there exists some
agents who can gain more rewards by being Defective. Note
that we could not alter the behaviors of Defective agents since
agents make decisions in a decentralized manner, but we can
affect Compliant agents’ policies in a way that lessens the re-
turn of Defective agent j, V
(pi1,pi2,...,pi
D
j ,...pin)
j (s0). That is,
our goal is to design a strategy for agents (in particular Com-
pliant agents) so that being Defective can damage the overall
reward:
∀j, V (pi1,pi2,...,pi
C
j ,...pin)
j (s0) ≥ V
(pi1,pi2,...,pi
D
j ,...pin)
j (s0) (4)
As mentioned in the preliminaries, general-sum matrix games
is the special case of two-player perfectly observable Markov
game when there is only one state and both players have only
two strategies to choose from. Similarly, if we take the case
where player i has only two strategies {Ci, Di} to choose
from ∀i, then the problem can be rephrased from the point-
of-view of game theory, as described below.
Let (S, f, n) be a normal-form game with n players, where
Si is the set of strategy for player i, S = S1 × S2 × · · · × Sn
is the set of strategy profiles and f(x) = (f1(x), . . . , fn(x))
is its payoff function evaluated at x ∈ S. Given that the
strategy set for player i can be denoted as {Ci, Di}, the set of
strategy profiles can be denoted as {C1, D1} × {C2, D2} ×
...×{Cn, Dn}. Let the strategy that player i takes as si, and x
be any strategy profile that consists of at least M% (M = 80
in our experiments) of Compliant strategies, then Equation
(3) becomes:
∃i s.t. fi(Ci, x∗−i) < fi(Di, x∗−i). (5)
The goal of Regulation Enforcement then becomes:
∀i : fi(Ci, x∗−i) ≥ fi(Di, x∗−i). (6)
where xi is a strategy profile of player i and x−i is a strategy
profile of all players excluding player i. Note that we adopt
similar notation as in Equation (2).
This is a realistic assumption. In real world, regulators (i.e.
governments) tend to lay down legislation but not all individ-
uals will be compliant. Furthermore, regulators often don’t
have any idea who is going to be compliant at first, they often
use detectors (i.e. speed cameras) to detect defective individ-
uals.
4 Proposed Framework
Intuitively, we aim to mitigate agents’ incentive to disobey
regulations. The goal is to lessen the rewards gained being
Defective comparing to those gained being Compliant. If this
can be achieved, then any rational agents will choose to be
Compliant. Note that in a decentralized environment, we can-
not force any agent to implement or execute any strategy be-
cause each agent makes its own decision.Thus, our plan is to
offer a framework that can benefit an agent in the long run, so
it has high motivation to implement and execute the compli-
ant strategy. The framework states that if defecting agents are
detected, an agent should shape its reward function towards
boycotting them, as illustrated in Figure 1. Note that an as-
sumption is made: at least M% of players are Compliant (M
has to represent the majority). Furthermore, since all agents
interact with one another in an environment with shared re-
sources, it is assumed that they can observe how many re-
wards (resources) other agents have collected. Intuitively,
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Figure 1: A simple illustration of the proposed framework. Red blocks denote the shared resource while blue blocks denote
agents. The detector takes a sequence of past actions or rewards as input and determines which agents are Defective. Agents
then incorporate that information into their observation and take action according to their policies trained with Boycotting
Reward Shaping (Equation 9).
the proposed method is trying to boycott Defective agents by
leveraging the aggregated power of Compliant agents.
There are two major components in our method: training a
detector and laying down a boycott strategy.
4.1 Detector
This detector makes prediction of Defective agents by ob-
serving agents’ behavior. More specifically, it takes reward
sequences and/or action sequences (if needed) of an agent as
input and learns to classify whether the agent is Compliant or
Defective. The underlining hypothesis is that since the goal of
a Defective agent is to obtain more rewards through not obey-
ing regulations, Defective agents shall be detectable based on
the their actions performed and sequence of rewards obtained.
More formally, let ~Ai,t denote the sequence of actions and/or
rewards of agent i up till time t, we aim to learn a detector
D( ~Ai,t, θ) parameterized by θ that outputs 1 (True) if agent
i is classified as Defective or 0 (False) if agent i is classified
as Compliant. Multiple inferences can be made at a time. In
many scenarios, a rule-based detector is sufficient. Take the
Replenishing Resource Management Dilemma for instance,
one simple rule is sufficient to determine whether a resource-
gathering agent exceeds the maximal quota allowed. How-
ever, some scenarios can be less trivial and a more sophis-
ticated classifier is required for detection. For example, to
detect whether a comity function is implemented in an auto-
driving agent.
In reality, the detector can be trained either centrally or in
a distributed manner. For example in human society, there
are detectors trained and deployed globally (i.e. surveillance
cameras) yet there are also detectors that varies among indi-
viduals (i.e. moral conscience). In our experiments, the de-
tector is trained as a global behavior detector for simplicity.
4.2 Boycotting Reward Shaping
We exploit the idea of Reward shaping [Ng et al., 1999] to
design the boycott strategy. Reward shaping is initially pro-
posed as an efficient way of including prior knowledge in the
learning problems so as to enhance the convergence rate. Ad-
ditional intermediate rewards are provided to enrich a sparse
base reward signal, giving the agent with useful gradient in-
formation.
In [Sun et al., 2018], instead of using reward shaping as a
way of enhancing convergence rate, they use reward shaping
to shape agents’ policies in an intended way. They suggest de-
signing a benevolent agent based on a reward shaping method
which diminishes rewards to make the agent feel less satisfied
for consecutive rewards.
R′(st, at, It) = R(st, at)×F(It) (7)
It =
W∑
i=1
R(st−i, at−i) (8)
F is a predetermined non-strictly decreasing function andW
is a chosen window size.
Similar to [Sun et al., 2018], we use reward shaping as a
method of shaping agents’ resulting policies. The idea states
that agents should optimize a mental-reward that is usually
different from the actual rewards obtained. We plan to design
a reward shaping scheme that encourages agents to boycott
Defective agents while maximizing their own reward. More
formally, Boycotting Reward Shaping is defined below:
Denote the trained detector as D where Dt(i) outputs 1 if
it classifies agent i as Defective or 0 if it classifies agent i as
Compliant. Let the reward function of agent i be R′i(st, at),
and the number of agents be N , agents have to optimize a
reward functionR′i(st, at) which is defined as
R′i(st, at) = Ri(st, at)−B ×
[
∑N
j=1Dt(j)×Robsj (st, at)]∑N
j=1Dt(j)
(9)
where B is a predetermined ratio which we refer to as the
Boycotting Ratio. Note that agents are not aware of the value
functions of other agents but they can observe the amount
of resources consumed by other agents in an environment of
shared utility. We use Robsj to denote the reward of agent j
observed by agent i. The rightmost term denotes the average
“observed” reward of all Defective agents. Note that B =
0 corresponds to the original scenario where no changes are
applied.
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Figure 2: Workflow to obtain empirical payoff matrices in Experiment 3. Agents that follow all regulations are Compliant
(blue) otherwise Defective (green). There are 10 agents in total and we fix 8 out of 10 agents as Compliant. We aim to observe
what is the payoff of the other 2 agents when they choose to behave compliantly or defectively. For each entry in the payoff
matrix, we train and evaluate the game correspondingly (notice how the number of green defectors vary between entries). By
repeatedly playing out the games using resulting joint policies, and averaging the results, we can obtain the payoffs for each
cell of the matrices.
5 Experiments
We conduct three experiments based on deep multi-agent re-
inforcement learning. In the first two experiments, we ad-
dress the scenarios of Replenishing Resource Management
Dilemma and Diminishing Reward Shaping Enforcement as
mentioned in the introduction section. In the third exper-
iment, we adopt similar settings as Experiment 1 and use
empirical game-theoretic analysis to observe how the pro-
posed method affects the empirical payoff matrices. We make
the assumption that at least M percentage of agents abide
by all regulation. Motivated by paper of similar line of re-
search [Turner, 2006], we set M = 80% in our experiments.
Note that if the proposed framework is able to solve the prob-
lem atM = 80%, it will also solve problems where the initial
percentage of compliant agents are ≥ 80%.
If we consider human society, starting with 80% of the
agents being compliant is a fairly low bound (in other words,
we are considering a society where 1 out of 5 people will
disobey the law). In our simulation experiments, in order to
ensure compliant agents behave so, we chose a random M%
subset of all agents and implement their value functions ac-
cording to the regulations.
5.1 Experiment 1: Replenishing Resource
Management Dilemma
In this experiment, we aim to address the scenario where
group members share a renewable resource and sustainable
development can only be achieved if no individual over har-
vest the resource. As a result, a regulation is laid down to
prevent gaining self-interest from over-harvesting.
To conduct the experiment, we design the following game.
There are 5 agents that interact with each other in a 20 x 20
grid world. Apple trees, which appear as red blocks on the
map, represent the replenishing resource. An apple tree will
die out (disappear) if more than 5 apples are collected, and a
new apple tree will appear at a random location on the map.
The regulation is that agents shall not collect more than 3
apples at any time. However, agents can obviously benefit
from not obeying the rule and collecting more than 3 apples
at a time.
This experiment has the following setting:
• REGULATION: For the sake of sustainable develop-
ment, all agents shall not collect more than 3 apples
at any time.
• Compliant Agents: Agents that are not collecting more
than 3 apples at any given time. There are 4 Compliant
agents.
• Defective Agents: Agents that collect more than 3 apples
at one or more times in the past. There is 1 Defective
agents that collects up to 5 apples at a time.
The percentage of Compliant agents M is set to 80% (4 out
of 5 agents are Compliant). Note that a rule-based detector
D that examines the collection rate is sufficient in this case.
Thus, in this experiment we will focus on the effectiveness of
boycotting.
5.2 Experiment 2: Diminishing Reward Shaping
Enforcement
In this experiment, we aim to address the scenario where
agents are not equally capable and have to share a kind of re-
source. Since members have varying capabilities, to prevent
stronger agents leaving weaker agents “starving”, the regula-
tion demands every agent to implement and conduct the di-
minishing reward function to act non-greedily as described
previously.
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To conduct the experiment, we design the following game.
As in Experiment 1, there are 5 agents in a 20 x 20 grid world,
4 out of 5 agents are Compliant, and apple trees represent the
shared resource. Different from the previous experiment, now
the agents are not equally capable: it takes one time step for a
stronger agent to collect 5 apples while it takes two time steps
for weaker agents to collect 5 apples. The regulation states
that all agents are required to implement diminishing reward
shaping so they do not act greedily. Understanding that an
agent (in particular the stronger one) can obviously benefit
from not obeying the rule to behave greedily, here we as-
sume the one particular strong agent to be Defective through
not implementing the diminishing reward. The goal of this
experiment is to evaluate whether the proposed Regulation
Enforcement framework can find and penalize the Defective
agent.
This experiment has the following settings:
• REGULATIONS: For the sake of avoid acting greed-
ily, all agents shall optimize a new reward function
R′(st, at, It) which is defined as (according to [Sun
et al., 2018])
R′(st, at, It) =
{R(st, at) It ≤ τ
−1 It > τ ‘ (10)
It =
3∑
i=1
R(st−i, at−i) (11)
where τ is set to 2.
• Compliant: Agents that implement the diminishing
reward function accordingly to the regulation above.
There are 4 Compliant agents.
• Defective: Agents that do not implement the diminishing
reward function. There is 1 Defective agents here.
Note that a rule-based detector D is not sufficient in this
case. A binary classifier needs to be trained to decide whether
an agent is Compliant or not. We will evaluate the detection
accuracy as well as the effectiveness of the boycotting frame-
work.
Figure 3: Detector accuracy with different length of observa-
tion sequence (Experiment 2).
5.3 Experiment 3: Payoff Matrices
In this experiment, we investigate the proposed task and solu-
tion using empirical game-theoretic analysis. We aim to ob-
serve how empirical payoff matrices evolve before and after
applying the regulation enforcement framework. We focus
on two players and regard all other 8 agents as part of the
dynamic environment. We adopt the scenario of Experiment
1, except that there are now 10 agents instead of 5. We will
evaluate on different choice of policies of these two players
and make the other 8 agents always Compliant. We train and
evaluate correspondingly to each situation to obtain the ma-
trices, filling one cell at a time, illustrated in Figure 2. We set
the Boycotting Ratio to 2 in this experiment.
5.4 Simulation Details
Games studied here are implemented in a large-scale 2D grid-
world platform MAgent [Zheng et al., 2017]. The state st and
the joint action of all players~a determines the state at the next
time-step st+1. Observations of agents depend on the agent’s
current position and consist of two parts, spatial local view
and non-spacial feature. Spatial view consists of several rect-
angular channels, which includes map of locations of other
agents and map of non-penetrable wall. These channels will
be masked by a circle and the radius of the circle is defined
as view range. In all our experiments, view range is set to
2, which means that the size of one channel is 5 × 5, where
2×2+1 = 5. Non-spatial feature includes last action, last re-
ward, absolute position of all other agents and apples, normal-
ized position of the agent, and ID embedding. ID embedding
is the binary representation of agent’s unique ID. Actions are
discrete actions such as move or gather. Similar to the ob-
servations, move range and gather range are circular range
with their radii denoted as move range and gather range
respectively. In our experiments, we set move range to 3
and gather range to 1. That makes 33 valid actions in to-
tal. Each episode lasts for 1, 000 steps and all results are ob-
tained from an average of 100 episodes after training 30000
episodes.
We use Double Dueling DQN [Van Hasselt et al., 2016;
Wang et al., 2015; Mnih et al., 2015] to simulate the game
since it converges faster than DRQN[Hausknecht and Stone,
2015] and A2C[Mnih et al., 2016] in our experiment. Default
neural networks have two convolution layers both with a 3×3
kernel and two fully connected dense layer. The spatial view
observation is fed into the two convolution layers followed by
two fully connected layers, which gives a vector of 256. The
non-spatial view is then concatenated with it before feeding it
into another fully connected layer. The last layer has the out-
put size of 33, which corresponds to the number of actions.
All layers are followed by Rectified Linear Unit (ReLU) ac-
tivation function.
During learning, to encourage exploration we implement
epsilon-greedy policies with epsilon piece-wise linear decay
over time. Each agent updates its policy given a stored batch
(“replay buffer”) of experienced transitions. Learning agents
are “independent” of one another and each regard others as
part of the environment. From the perspective of a player, the
learning of other players shows up as a non-stationary envi-
ronment. Each individual agent’s learning depends only on
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the other agent’s learning via the (slowly) changing distribu-
tion of experience it generates. Codes will be made public.
6 Results
We will discuss the results separately for the two major
components of the proposed framework: detecting and boy-
cotting.
6.1 Detector
For Experiment 1 and Experiment 3, a rule-based detector is
sufficient to achieve 100% accuracy. Thus, here we report the
result from the trained detector in Experiment 2. We extracted
10000 trajectories of trained agents, half of them are extracted
from agents that obey the regulation where the other half are
taken from agents that disobey the regulation. We preprocess
those trajectories into sequence of rewards and randomly se-
lect 20% of them as the testing set. Using a 4-layer fully
connected neural network as the classifier, we ran prediction
on the testing set after 100 epochs of training. All layers use
Rectified Linear Unit (ReLU) activation function except the
last output layer which uses Sigmoid activation function. Re-
sults are shown in Figure 3. We can see that in this experiment
the behavior of agents that do not implement the diminishing
reward can be detected with high accuracy, and using longer
sequence of observations yields better performance.
Figure 4: Illustration of Table 1. The horizontal red line de-
notes the average episode return the Defective agents will ob-
tain if it behaves compliantly instead.
Figure 5: Illustration 3 of Table 2. The horizontal red line
denotes the average episode return the Defective agents will
obtain if it behaves compliantly instead.
Avg(C)
All Compliant 984.7
Boycotting Ratio Avg(C) Avg(D)
0.0 (original) 976.0 1063.3
0.5 963.8 1013.9
1.0 949.5 891.7
1.5 948.6 871.7
2.0 909.9 818.0
Table 1: Result of Experiment 1. Avg(D) denotes the average
episode return of Defective agents while Avg(C) denotes the
average episode return of Compliant agents.
Weak Strong
All Compliant 796.2 887.2
Boycotting Ratio Avg(C) Avg(D)
0.0 (original) 795.5 1110.0
0.5 791.2 1045.0
1.0 777.8 969.0
1.5 762.2 869.6
2.0 703.1 859.6
Table 2: Result of Experiment 2. Avg(D) denotes the average
episode return of Defective agents while Avg(C) denotes the
average episode return of Compliant agents.
6.2 Boycotting Reward Shaping
The results of Experiments 1 and 2 are shown in Figure 4 and
Table 1 as well as Figure 5 and Table 2 respectively. Episode
return is calculated by counting the number of apples (shared
resource) agents collect in an episode. From the tables, we
can see that if we assume 80% (4 out of 5) of the agents are
Compliant, our goal as stated in Equation 6 can be fulfilled by
setting the Boycotting RatioB to 1.0 or higher for Experiment
1 and 1.5 or higher for Experiment 2. The goal is achieved
when the blue line goes below the red line in Figure both 4
and 5, which means gaming on the system through violating
the regulation can result in worse reward. Below we further
describe some important observations.
First, we can observe that higher Boycotting Ratio leads to
lower return of both Defective and Compliant agents. This
is reasonable because a higher Boycotting Ratio means that
Compliant agents are more encouraged to boycott the Defec-
tive agents or consume resources that are more likely of De-
fective agents’ interest. As result, the Defective agent gains
lower return, and the Compliant agents also gain lower re-
turn because their objective is “deviated” from maximizing
their own rewards. We can think of the boycotting ratio as a
measure of the boycotting power we distilled from compliant
agents. Higher boycotting ratio is not necessarily better since
it leads to less reward for those compliant agents’ reward (Fig.
4 and 5.). This can cause the percentage of compliant agents
to decrease. To further illustrate this, we can draw an anal-
ogy between the boycotting ratio and tax rate. The higher the
tax rate is, the government gets more money but more peo-
ple may try to evade taxes. In short, the boycotting ratio and
the percentage of compliant agents forms a dynamic equilib-
7
rium. We left this topic as future work since this can be an
independent line of research.
Note that all agents are equally capable (meaning that
two agents will have the same expected return if they are
both Compliant or both Defective) in Experiment 1 but not
in Experiment 2. In Experiment 2, we deliberately make
agents boycott the agents who are not only Defective but
also stronger inherently.The first row in Table 2 shows that
even if all agents implement diminishing rewards, stronger
agents still get considerably more reward than the weaker
ones. That is the essence of diminishing reward shaping
[Sun et al., 2018] since it still maintains non-homogeneous
equality (Stronger agents can still obtain more resources than
the weaker ones). However, the gap between them becomes
much larger (from 81.0 to 314.5) if the stronger agent opts
to be Defective. It reassure the necessity of a framework like
ours to discourage cheating, as otherwise the stronger agents
will have much higher motivation to not obey the regulation.
We can also observe that a higher Boycotting Ratio is required
in Experiment 2 to successfully boycott the Defective agent.
That can also be explained by the fact that Defective agents
in Experiment 2 are inherently stronger.
The result of Experiment 3 is shown in Table 3. If we view
the 8 other agents as part of the dynamic environment, and
the two remaining players only have two strategies {C,D} to
choose from, the result can then be interpreted as the payoff
matrix of a general-sum matrix game. We can see how the
payoff matrix evolves. Before applying our framework, mu-
tual defection is the Nash Equilibrium. After our framework
is applied, mutual compliant becomes the new Nash Equi-
librium. This illustrates that our solution is able to promote
compliance. Note that it is reasonable that after applying our
method, agents gain less rewards. Recall that our goal is to
ensure agents follow regulations that aim to ensure sustain-
able development of resources. Violating the regulation will
surely lead to short term gain of rewards (i.e., 844.2 compared
to 728.1) but sacrifices long-term sustainability.
Before C D
C 728.1, 728.1 677.4, 935.0
D 935.0, 677.4 844.2,844.2
After C D
C 728.1, 728.1 683.1, 481.0
D 481.0, 683.1 677.8, 677.8
Table 3: Result of Experiment 3. A strategy profile (cell) is
boldfaced if it is a Nash Equilibrium.
7 Conclusions
In this paper, we first propose the problem Regulation En-
forcement from both RL and game theory perspective. We
also present a solution to the problem which aims to elimi-
nate the incentive of agents violating regulations in order to
gain more rewards in multi-agent reinforcement learning sce-
narios. Our solution involves two major components: a de-
tector to identify Defective agents and a new regulation that
states a boycotting strategy. We demonstrate the effective-
ness of the method under two different scenarios - Replen-
ishing Resource Management Dilemma and Diminishing Re-
ward Shaping Enforcement. We also show how the empirical
payoff matrices evolves after applying our method, using em-
pirical game-theoretic analysis. The proposed method “trans-
fers” the Nash Equilibrium from mutual defective to mutual
compliant.
We expect our paper to ignite more research along this line
since there are many future challenges remained. Below, we
listed some major challenges that worth more investigation:
can we provide a theoretical analysis for the lower bound M
(the percentage of compliant agents)? How can we quantify
impact of detection errors on the effectiveness of the boy-
cott mechanism? How to train effective detectors efficiently
in the context of online multi-agent learning? How does the
boycotting power distilled from compliant agents relate with
the percentage of agents that remain compliant if we consider
emotions as a factor? Can we model emotions explicitly in
our simulation and how?
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